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T’was slouching towards an illusion and now it’s scurrying toward a delusion: A COVID19-
shocked doughnut model economy1  
Voxi Heinrich Amavilah, Ph.D. 
Abstract: An easy way of observing and predicting changes in the structure and behavior of any free-
market economy is to track changes in its circular flow model of economic activity. Using book titles as a 
literature review in combinations with a few classics, I describe how the circular flows of free -market 
economies evolved from little, gentle, and now nearly powerless government role, culminating in super-
duper capitalism. First the evolution generated great wealth and income, and of late also increasing 
inequality. Processes like globalization that allowed for economic convergence also spurred enormous 
tensions. The resulting stresses and strains are responsible for unpopular populism and nationalism. The 
doughnut economic model provides a reasonable framework for explaining what we observe. It shows a 
decline in the social foundations of human rights, made worse by breaches in the “planetary boundaries” 
both of which squeeze the livable space ever more tightly like a boa-constrictor suffocating its prey. In this 
paper I do not go as far as measuring my observations, but the directions for policy and future research 
have clearly been established.  Regarding the latter, one may want to examine how COVID19 has shocked 
into scurrying towards a delusion of a system that was already slouching towards an illusion. It turns out 
that the illusion is not a new prediction. In his critique of Marx and rationalization of Kondratieff’s waves 
(K-waves) Schumpeter predicted that capitalism as an innovation is not immune to the “gale of creative 
destruction.” 
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sustainable development, planetary limits, unpopular populism, super-duper capitalism 
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 The first part of this essay partly states and restates things I wrote about in “Capitalism through the Shifting Eye of 
the Circular Flow Model” ( https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/capitalism-through-shifting-eye-circular-flow-model-
amavilah/?trackingId=RPzldtWFRPu6t5tmGWfkiw%3D%3D . May 5, 2019) and in “The rise of unpopular 
populism and the re-tribalization of the world: What now policy and research?” 
(https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/rise-unpopular-populism-re-tribalization-world-what-policy-amavilah/ , December 
23, 2017). 
 





One of my favorite hobbies is reading book titles. I enjoy reading book titles so much that I can 
easily spend hours between bookshelves in bookstores and libraries. I read all titles, but I am often 
in the business, economics, and current affairs sections. How much one can learn from the titles: 
the diversity of thoughts, the time periods, and what occupies attention during those periods. The 
first part of this essay is based on what I learned from book titles on visits to college bookstores at 
Brown University, University of Chicago, and Northwestern University in 2019. Over 15 titles 
attracted my attention, 75% of which were on two subject matters: Climate change, and income 
and wealth inequalities. The importance of both subject matters is common knowledge. My 
question is about whether there were early signs of the changing structure from economic theory. 
From book titles (a form of literature review) I observed changes in the circular flow model of 
economic activity (CFM) over time, changes that seem to have predicted the slouching of the 
global free-market economic system towards an illusion (super-duper capitalism), and hence 
increased inequality of income and wealth pre-Covid19. Now Covid19 has just shocked the system 
scurrying towards a delusion.  
In this essay, I first outline the changes in the circular model over time that indicated the slouching 
towards an illusion. Second, I argue that super-duper capitalism has increased cross-country 
interactions via globalization without necessarily increasing intra-actions within countries. The 
unequal distribution of the benefits of globalization led to what may be called unpopular populism 
and nationalism. The third section reviews and remodels Raworth’s (2012; 2017) doughnut model 
that suggests the thinning out of the doughnut’s livable space (middle ring) as the hole in its center 
(deprivation space) has gotten bigger and bigger at the same time as  the outer crust of the doughnut 
(“planetary boundaries”) has been punctured. Fourthly, I shock the doughnut economy with 
COVID19 to illustrate how the model can be estimated empirically without implementing it. 
Finally, I make some concluding remarks, in which I link my observations to the four features that 
characterize the progress of human innovations like capitalism itself put forward by Schumpeter 
(1939; 1942; 1954).  
2. Slouching towards an illusion 
2.1 Circular flow model with little or no Government 
The titles I browsed suggested changes in how decision-makers alter their interactions over time 
and such changes have important implications for wealth and income creation and distribution, 
and environmental changes, including climate change. As a result, the circular flow model (CFM), 
which is the first economic model in all textbooks on economic principles, has been morphing 
often unnoticed. For example, in Richard Cantillon’s (1932[1755]) version of the CFM, labor 
works for farmers for wages, and for artisans in exchange of goods. Artisans supply goods to 
entrepreneurs for commodities. Entrepreneurs supply goods to property owners for commodities, 
and earn a profit from the commodities they sell to farmers. Farmers rent land from property 
owners. This “primitive” CFM suggested that trade creates money wealth, and the supply of money 
influences relative prices – the so-called “Cantillon effect" or the “non-neutrality of money” 
(Humphrey, 1991; cf.  “neutrality of money” hypotheses, Snowdon and Vane, 2004). 
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Francois Quesnay’s (1972[1759]) well-known Tableau economique acknowledged Cantillon, but 
disputed the suggestion that trade was the source of wealth, a dispute that appears in the 
background of Adam Smith’s notion of the “invisible hand” (Smith, 1976[1776]). According to 
Smith trade extends the market size, but the extent to which it does so Smith questioned as apparent 
from his a critique of the mercantile system (Book IV), although he was gentler than Quesnay who 
argued that France’s poverty was caused by mercantilism. As far as Quesnay was concerned 
wealth comes from “agricultural surplus” in the form of the rents, wages, and purchases the surplus 
generates. Three agents are behind this process: The proprietary (landowner) class, the productive 
class (agricultural laborers), the sterile (unproductive) class of artisans and merchants, and the 
government (italics are Quesnay’s). For this reason, Smith entrusts government only with national 
defense; he is even skeptical about the government’s effectiveness in providing public education, 
for example. 
Next was Karl Marx (1906[1873]) who extended Quesnay by stressing the reproducibility of 
surplus by “circulation of capital” as a key driver of economic growth. Here wage-laborers create 
surplus value; employers either consume (hoard) surplus to sustain the steady state, or they re-
invest the surplus to create even more surplus.  To Marx the government and its instruments are 
no better for labor than capital, hence the need for a proletariat dictatorship. The fact that both 
Smith and Marx held skeptical views of the role of government is regrettably often missed. 
2.2 CFM with Government: A gentle capitalism 
It was John M. Keynes (1936) and his protégé, Richard Stone who conceptualized the textbook 
version of the CFM (Stone and Saffi Stone, 1959; 1961), although the diagram was formalized by 
Frank Knight (1951[1933]) and redrawn by Paul Samuelson (1948[1970]). I say “redrawn” to 
acknowledge that Stigler (1965) has argued that “Say’s letters [to Malthus] have considerable 
merit, and in particular they contain a remarkable sketch of the circular flow model in an enterprise 
economy” (p. 325). This means that from Cantillon to Marx the role of government in the CFM 
was either absent or miniscule. Despite being more of a correlation than a causation, the absence 
of government also coincided with the brutal exploitation of labor by capital, the concern that gave 
traction to Marx and Marxism in Europe generally pre-WWI and in Russia particularly post-1917. 
Coming out of the ravages of WWII nearly everyone accepted the positive role of government. 
Hence, Keynes, Knight, and Samuelson had a supportive company in redrawing the CFM with 
government in its center. The prosperity, peace, and relative freedom during the 1950s, civil rights 
campaigns and political struggles for independence in the 1960-1970s all came to be associated 
with effective governance – good or bad. At the time, the goodness of government under socialism 
and capitalism was a matter of degree since both the West and the USSR had admiring followers. 
In fact, for a while it looked like the growth and likability of government was stronger under 
socialism than capitalism and the West felt compelled to slow the tide in Cuba, Vietnam, etc. As 
a result, the foreign sector of the CFM expanded, and along with economic, military, and all other 





2.3 CFM and the illusion of super-duper capitalism 
By the 1980s, capitalism had re-invented itself, confident and triumphant over socialism in all 
areas except the mutually assured destructive power of nuclear weapons. Essentially Government 
relinquished its central role to business and free markets; the household became a decision-maker 
only insofar as business benefited more. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the 
subsidence of the dotcom wave a decade later both strengthened the new capitalism. Globalization 
spread widely and aggressively, benefitting some, over-promising everyone, weakening the 
household and labor even more, infuriating many, and sowing the seeds of the unpopular populism 
and nationalism that ensued (Obstfeld, 2020). Politicians started to shun Government as 
unproductive again. President Ronald Reagan even declared that “government is the problem” – 
an idea he shared with Professor Milton Friedman (1993). The shift was not ideological; President 
Bill Clinton came to declare “the days of big government over.” Presumably, everyone can do 
everything alone better than government. It is difficult to assess what made the role of government 
such a bad idea at the time when at home significant social problems like homelessness were on 
the rise.  
Not all economists brought into the virtue of super-duper capitalism and its redesigned CFM 
(Hoogvelt, 2001). For instance, Professor Stiglitz (2000[1986]) was concerned enough about the 
diminishing role of government that he added non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to the 
center of the CFM diagram, along with government. Government continued its role in national 
defense, law and order, infrastructure, education, and institutional governance. NGOs filled in the 
remaining nooks and crannies. Paul Krugman’s (1997) Age of Diminished Expectations and 
Krugman (1988) before that were other hints at the changing structure and function of the 
economy. As if all that was not a big enough jolt, technological advancement put business on 
steroids, giving birth to Supercapitalism (Reich, 2009), or Hypercapitalism (Gonick and Kasser, 
2018), or “capitalism without capital” (Haskel and Westlake, 2018; Eyal, Szelenyi, and Townsley, 
1998; cf. Piketty, 2014). My judgment is that capitalism is increasingly without capital and labor 
-- wasting both as I show below.  
Historically the sources of wealth defined the CFM framework – the conventional nature of 
capitalist development (Giddens, 1971). In Antiquity wealth came from the “divine” robbery of 
convicts and slaves. Ostensibly the convicts, slaves, and poor people deserved plunder – making 
them worse-off did not contravene God’s will at all. During the Middle Ages a key enlightenment 
was the formation of an alliance between divinity and imperial power that allowed for the 
combination of land robbery and spoils of war as sources of national wealth (Genghis Khan), and 
personal or quasi-personal wealth (William the Conqueror). When the early Modern Era rolled 
around, land, classically defined, became the principal source of wealth, see e.g., Fugger and 
family in steel and copper and King Mansa Musa in gold. Hence, the significance of labor and 
capital, and the struggle between the two as described by Marx, is a relative phenomenon 
associated with the capitalist stage of human development, to paraphrase Marx. Not only did 
capitalism win the struggle, but it also won in ways Marxists never predicted. Clearly Marx and 
Engels (1848) knew that capitalism was by far the most productive economic system ever. 
However, they failed to anticipate that capital could co-opt labor and thereby weakening its 
“consciousness.” In fact, one can argue that the productivity of capitalism gave rise to inequality 
and exacerbated climate change in ways that redraws the CFM. In the new CFM the Household 
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(especially labor) has been disabled and thereby reducing its power in factor markets. The Firm’s 
influence over Government as opposed to Government’s influence over the Firm has increased. 
Very few politicians can now win elections without the sponsorship and blessings of corporations. 
After holding political offices politicians are then obliged to work as lobbyists for their former 
sponsors. 
2.4 CFM, and tribal unpopular populism 
Super-duper capitalism induced many dissatisfactions including what I call here “unpopular 
populism” In Pop Internationalism Krugman (1996) defines “pop internationalists [as] people who 
speak of international trade while ignoring basic economics and misusing economic figures” ( […] 
added). The book describes six misconceptions of pop internationalism. According to the 
misconceptions, the United States needed a “new paradigm” for “competing in the world 
marketplace.” To be competitive all nations must have high “productivity” in the “high-value 
sectors,” themselves characterized by a kind of managed comparative advantage. Michael Porter 
(1990) has called this kind of advantage “competitive advantage.” In fact, in some circles “high-
value sectors” were treated synonymously with high-tech sectors, made possible by “public-
private partnerships.” The success of the five misconceptions was then measured by the number 
of jobs created. 
Pop internationalist ideas were indeed popular, and they spread easily and quickly globally, 
allowing for oligopolies like NAFTA, WTO, and the like to emerge, and institutions like the World 
Bank and IMF to recommend them to developing countries as good policy. Quite obviously 
economic theory predicts higher rents from these types of collusion, absence of cheating. But as 
John Perkins recites in his Confessions of an Economic Hit Man (2005), most policies of this genre 
have had heavy direct and indirect costs for developing countries. 
During the Clinton administrations, pop internationalism came to mean the same thing as 
globalization. Star-quality academics gave globalization their blessings on the basis of new and 
conventional trade theory driven by “competitive advantages,” including comparative advantage 
(Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Krugman, 1988; Borrus, Tyson, and Zysman, 1988; Sachs, 2005; 
Bhagwati, 2004; Stiglitz, 2002). The United States was the example of the virtues of globalization. 
The exponential growth of the money and other values of Silicon Valley (so-called dotcom 
economy) made America the envy of the world. But envy had two dissimilar sides: good and 
bad. On the good side, many countries wanted to be like America. As one simple example among 
numerous, the Bundesregierung (German federal government) sought to soften its immigration 
visa requirement to compete with the US H1B Visa for highly skilled workers from the East Indian 
sub-continent mainly. On the bad side was the feeling that the outcome of globalization was a net 
loss, and who to blame, but the guy at center stage (America). The twin bombings of the U.S. 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, to the extent both were in discriminant in design (carried out to 
hurt America and her supporters alike) suggest that hatred was towards the global capitalist system 
as much as it was towards America. 
Again, at the height of pop internationalism both inward and outward globalization was acceptable: 
Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. were essentially becoming one economy, and moves for a European 
Union, African Union, and so on were accelerating. Economic geographers began to call this form 
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of globalization localization. Both research and policy expected positive externalities from 
localization in terms of agglomeration, neighborhood, cluster, and network effects (including the 
effects of information and communication technologies). However, after the 911 attacks, and 
mainly because of it, inward globalization became unpopular, giving roots to what I call unpopular 
populism and nationalism -- a phenomenon that accelerated as the U.S. pursued two war against 
international terrorism. 
Under President Bush II, the neo-conservative ideology of the day pushed for global American 
military dominance even if it meant violence if it kept the peace at home. The high cost of two big 
wars and many small wars, and the election to office of President Obama slowed the growth of 
unpopular populism, but only for a while. Today almost the same misconceptions that underscored 
pop internationalism have found new expressions and spokespersons. Globalization has been 
challenged by nationalism, adding fuel to the unpopular populism fire. Unpopular populism incites 
local support, but nearly always fails to garner global popularity. Back in 2016 The Economist 
magazine profiled this kind of populism under the title “The League of nationalists.” A few 
misconceptions appear to drive populism. One is the perceived threat to nationalism posed by the 
rise in immigration and the growth of interactive Diasporas. However, of the countries surveyed 
foreign-born residents made up a tiny fraction of their populations, about 9.3% on average, ranging 
from the low of 2% in India to a high of 16.5% in Sweden. The Economist’s data shows that all 
countries, especially developing ones, see globalization and other forms of global links as a “force 
for good.” However, immigrants are considered a liability in France, Denmark, Malaysia, and 
Thailand. The feelings of the latter two cases are fascinating considering the fact not many people 
migrate to those countries and the majority of those who do are likely ethnic Asians from 
neighboring countries. Measured as trade, globalization is popular mostly in industrialized 
countries even as the epicenter of unpopular populism is located there as well, although The 
Economist points out the exceptions of India, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines where self-
sufficiency is valued more than imports. This is rather paradoxical since more people emigrate 
than immigrate to these countries (cf. Ginsburgh, Perelman, and Pestieu, 2020).  
 There is enough research supporting globalization for its positive net effect, but that is not the 
point here (Amavilah, 2009a, b). Even among the countries The Economist described only a small 
fraction of them (US, Australia, UAE, Thailand, and India) consider themselves to be “the best 
country in the world.” Moreover, even within those countries only persons aged 55 years and older 
hold that view, which is understandable since they are the likely losers from globalization 
compared to their highly educated and globally-savvy 18-34-year-old compatriots. The Economist 
shows that anti-globalization, and hence unpopular populism, is a function of low literacy in 
Germany, Britain, and France (Obstfeld, 2020). 
Now, suppose that globalization does indeed threaten nationalism, and that retribalization is 
a natural response. How demonstrably feasible is such a response to solving the ills of 
globalization? The answer is up in the air. Economic history, though, shows beyond any reasonable 
doubt that, more than any other single thing, the foreign market extent and the 
supporting institutions built for it have had a huge effect on the growth and productivity of the 
global economy (disregarding distributive issues). Summarizing his theory of economic growth in 
his acceptance lecture for the Nobel Prize Sir W.A. Lewis (1979) observed that the major global 
economies of scale the world has seen over the 1940-1970s years have resulted from long distance 
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transportation of goods, assuming older technologies. One might add even greater benefits have 
come from the transfer and adoption of ideas given newer information and communication 
technologies today (Schultz, 1981; 1961).  
Under conditions of retribalization are we now to assume diseconomies of scale (diminishing 
returns to globalization) from global interactions?  No matter one’s answer, the question itself is 
puzzling since early accounts by roving anthropologists, treasure hunters, and missionaries helped 
identify the lack of a common language and ethno-fractionalization as major constraints on the 
progress of developing countries. These variables are now found in nearly all growth regressions 
about developing countries. What does this all now mean? Does it mean development agencies 
(World Bank, IMF, UN agencies, and so on)  have all been wrong to advise developing countries 
to abandon their tribes and tribal institutions, or should policy and research now pay special 
attention to the effects of tribal tendencies in industrialized countries as well? Just wondering, and 
the wonder brings us back to some of the titles of the books I browsed. Field (2010) provided a 
historical trace of capitalism from whence it came along the goods and the bads it dispensed. On 
balance, Field concluded that capitalism has been more beneficial that dangerous to humanity. 
However, according to Korten (2010), capitalism created wealth for the few and poverty for many. 
Technology simply magnified inequality such that innovation is really an illusion about why “so 
little [goes to] so many working so hard” (Erixon and Weigel, 2016, […] and italics added). In my 
viewpoint the question should be about “why so much is going to so few from so many working so 
hard for so little.” From that perspective I understand the reasoning in Pilling (2019) reference to 
growth as a delusion, and to wealth as a paradox as far as Mols and Jetten (2017; 2015) are 
concerned. The idea of “capitalism without capital” is strikingly illuminating; multimillion-dollar 
malls are disappearing with the increase in online shopping. The capital-wealthy are losing value 
to the data-wealthy (Google, Facebook, and on). The data wealthy use labor to produce services 
for them at no cost and only in exchange for a free social media account. These disparities are 
calling for: (i) an “agenda for a new economy” (Korten, 2009) in which social interactions are the 
building blocks; (ii) “economics for the common good” (Tirole, 2017; cf. Amavilah, 2016); and 
(iii) an “inclusive economy” (Tanner, 2018). Thus, the point that Piketty makes in Capital and 
Ideology (2020) is well-taken, although the book should have been titled “Capital is Ideology” or 
“Capital as Ideology.”  
The growing income and wealth gaps between the rich 1-percenters and the poor 90-percenters is 
a matter of fact in nearly every country now. The next big struggle is no longer between capital 
and labor; instead, it is the fight between the old object-based wealthy and new data-based wealthy. 
The old rich are now tethering on the edge of losing it all without replacing their wealth and power 
invested in multibillion physical structures and land to the new wealthy. The global consequence 
is that, as the wise African philosopher once said, “when two bull elephants fight, it is the grass 
beneath that suffers the most.” In this case the “grass beneath” is labor and capital alike. Much of 
all this results from the fact that free markets misprice, or assign a zero value to, personal data. In 
reality the minimum price of data should equal to user value of the information in it before it is 
monetized as there is no way Facebook or Google can monetized data that doesn’t have some  
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initial value in it. No mining company will not find gold where there is none; in fact, the extraction 
(including refinery) costs are generally lower the higher the grade.2  
3. Scurrying towards a delusion 
 
3.1 Raworth’s original doughnut economy 
 
Kate Raworth (2017[2012]) charge that “the [economic] theory – and the maths used to prove it – 
[is] absurdly narrow in its assumptions” (p.1, […] added) and the “doughnut” model  she has 
proposed both have revitalized the study of human wellbeing by adding “seven [new] ways of 
thinking about the 21st Century” economics (Raworth, 2012, Figure 1, p. 4; Rockstrom, et al, 2009, 
Figure 1, p. 1; see contrast in Raworth, 2017, pp. 24-25). The model is a novel ‘social innovation’ 
(Moulaert and MacCallum, 2019; Bornstein, 2007) that depicts a system in which human 
wellbeing is the sum of a safe and humane space, bordered by its social foundations on one hand 
and “planetary boundaries” on the other hand. The social foundations are the inner ring of the 
doughnut which form the backstop for fundamental human rights to water, food, health, gender 
equality, social equity, energy, jobs, voice, resilience, education, and income.  The lack and 
insecurity of these rights represent a “critical human deprivation” (p. 9, and Table 1, p. 255). These 
rights sync perfectly with UN sustainable development goals (UNSDGs, 2015).  
The outer ring of the doughnut constitutes the “planetary boundaries” of the system: climate 
change, fresh water use, nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, ocean acidification, chemical pollution, 
atmospheric aerosol loading, ozone depletion, biodiversity loss, and land use, in no particular order 
(Raworth, 2012, Figure 2, p. 11; Rockstrom et al, 2009, Figure 1, p. 1). These represent the limits 
beyond which there is no light at the end of the tunnel for humanity. Unfortunately, three of these 
boundaries (nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, biodiversity loss, and climate change) have already 
been breached (Raworth, 2017, Figure 2, p. 258; Rockstrom, et al 2009, Figure 1, p. 1).  
The safe and humane space lies between the social foundations which form its base (lower limit) 
and the “planetary boundaries” (upper limit) which constrain it. For this space to be inclusive and 
sustainable it must be able to produce and distribute equitably positive externalities while 
generating either zero, and or internalizing all the negative externalities it generates. It must also 
do so in a way that pulls people out of the doughnut hole, i.e., it reaffirms human rights, and creates 
an inclusive and sustainable space for all at the table of a diverse humanity. Presently many people 
around the world are justified in reciting a rephrased versions of Malcolm X’s maxim that “I cannot 
sit at your table [during dinner] with nothing in my plate and call myself a diner. My being [at the 
table] does not make me [a diner]” (X, 1964). This means that diversity without inclusivity is 
unstable. 
Obviously, Raworth’s construct depicts the theoretical world well and allows for a better 
understanding of the world we live in now. In our world today all the developing countries and 
most emerging market economies are deprived of fundamental human rights; they are in the inner 
 
2
 A recent Netflix movie “The Social Media Dilemma” shows the costs and benefits of this model of attention 
extraction, manipulation, and selling. 
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ring of doughnut and most of their people are in the doughnut hole. Only a few industrialized 
countries have access to human rights, but the pressure that their production and consumption puts 
on the planetary constraints stresses the whole system enormously, affecting the hole of the 
doughnut disproportionately more and reducing the ability of “the safe and just space for 
humanity” to provide for “inclusive and sustainable development” (quotes are Raworth’s words). 
Raworth (2017) asks a poignant question: “If humanity’s twenty-first-century goal is to get into 
the doughnut, what economic mindset will give us the best chance of getting there?” (p. 10, cf. 
Raworth, 2012). Applications of the doughnut model to answer that question are rapidly growing 
with the city of Amsterdam set for a post-COVID19 experiment is the latest example. In this paper 
I assess the nexus between the human rights on the left-hand side (LHS), and the livable space and 
planetary boundaries on the righthand side (RHS), in the aftermath of COVID19 (Raworth, 2020; 
2017; Cole, 2015).  
As conceived by the UN Sustainable Development Goals (UNSDGs), water, food, health, gender 
equality, social equity, energy, jobs, voice, resilience, education, and income represent 
fundamental human rights (𝑌𝑖). These rights are enhanced or hindered by the ability of the livable 
space (𝑋𝑖) to pull people out of the doughnut inner ring (deprivation space). The ability and safety 
of the desirable space is a function of inclusive and sustainable economic development (𝑄𝑖). This 
kind of development is not a function of degenerative economic growth as normally represented 
by the growth of gross domestic product (GDP). Instead it is an agnostic growth addition that is 
self-regenerative and recognizes that human life is a large, complex, and nurturing system, and not 
the mechanical system of Newtonian physics implied by the Samuelsonian CFM (Raworth, 2017, 
pp. 1-26). The integral economy is self-transcendental, open to change, self-enhancing, and self-
conserving, and Raworth calls this the “Schwartz’s value circumflex” (p. 93).  
Economic development (𝑄𝑖(𝑋𝑖)) is ultimately subject to “planetary boundaries” (𝑍𝑖). The new and 
emerging literature on degrowth (Chevtkovskaya, Paulsson, and Barca, 2019), the neoclassical 
redux (Stiglitz, Fitoussi, and Durand, 2019) that destress the quantity, and emphasize the quality, 
of GDP, or the new-found concern for inequality (Ostry, Loungani and Berg, 2019) – all these 
strands of literature support Raworth’s concern, and some answers are beginning to emerge.  
Newell and Patterson (2010) propose “climate capitalism” -- a supply-side economy in which 
capitalists value the environment because they make money from it (Keohane and Olmstead, 2007; 
Tester, et al, 2005; Smil. 2003; Frumkin, 2010).  To Hahnel (2011) “climate capitalism” is not 
enough unless it assumes that negative externalities are the rule rather than the exception to 
capitalist production [and consumption]. This is because the want for profit is what motivates 
capitalism, not honorable things like caring for the earth’s climate (Perelman, 2000; Dowd, 2000). 
Environmentally-friendly capitalism, even when profitable, is to be unlikely regenerative without 
correcting the demand-side ills – social injustice, racial and gender inequities, etc. Bowles and 
Gentis (2000a) have argued that not only has income and wealth inequality risen, it has become 
acceptable to such an extent that “egalitarianism” is laughed at while at the same time inequality 
is increasingly socially-inheritable (Bowles and Gentis, 200b; 2002). Even when acknowledged, 
argued Verba, et. al (1987) the idea of equality may have elitist labels attached to it. In that sense 
equality is really equalities: Public or private, economic (income and wealth), sociopolitical (rights 
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and participation), opportunity (real or ideal), and the role of the state in value formation, 
protection, promotion, and in the quality of leadership. In fact, what does product efficiency and 
equality mean in the global economy rule by “borderless” principles of “economics”? (Guest, 
2011). Globalization has multiplied both the world problems and prospects as 
Venkatasubramanian (2017) writes in “How Much Inequality Is Fair.”   
To illustrate let us express the doughnut relationship compactly as a Cobb-Douglas function: 𝑌𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖𝑏𝑍𝑖𝑐,           (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖 is a cross-section of the social foundations: water, food, health, gender equality, social 
equity, energy, jobs, voice, resilience, education, and income, 𝑋𝑖 is a measure of “the safe and just 
space for humanity,” and 𝑍𝑖 are the upper limits of nature. Empirically, 𝑋𝑖 can be proxied by 
variables like the human development index (HDI) or by the index of sustainable economic welfare 
(ISEW). The advantage of the HDI is that it is available for many countries. The weakness is that 
it is too aggregate, and its calculation include some elements of the inner ring such as health, 
education, and income where it is degenerative. The strengths of ISEW include the fact that it 
accounts for nonmarket dimensions of welfare, but it also includes indicators of planetary 
boundaries such as environmental cost, social costs on such things as crime, and its data is not 
readily available for most countries (Chelli, Ciommi,  and Gigliarano, 2013; Castaneda, 1999; 
Mannis, undated). Parameters 𝑏, 𝑐 Raworth parameters.  
3.2 Raworth’s endogenous doughnut economy  
We know from theory that 𝑋𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖(𝑄𝑖),  where  𝑄𝑖 is some measure of sustainable and inclusive 
economic development which I define as economic growth and technological change, so that (1) 
is 𝑌𝑖 = [𝑋𝑖(𝑄𝑖)]𝑏𝑍𝑖𝑐.          (2) 
In the endogenous growth model, the laws of motion behind (2) can be framed according to Lucas 
(1988, 1993) and Romer (1986, 1990), i.e., 𝑄𝑖 = 𝐴𝐿𝑖𝛼𝐾𝑖∗𝛽 = 𝐴𝐿𝑖𝛼𝐾𝑖𝛽𝐾(𝜇𝐻𝑖)𝛽𝐻 , 𝐾∗ = 𝐾𝑖 +  𝜇𝐻𝑖, 𝛽 =  𝛽𝐾 +  𝛽𝐻     (Lucas) 𝑄𝑖 = (𝐴𝐿𝑄)𝛼(𝐴𝐻𝑄)(𝐴𝐾𝑄)𝛾         (Romer) 
This means that for Lucas and Romer, respectively, (2) becomes 𝑌𝑖 = (𝐴𝐿𝑖)𝑏𝛼 𝐾𝑖𝑏𝛽𝐾 (𝜇𝐻𝑖)𝑏𝛽𝐻𝑍𝑖𝑐           (3.1) 𝑌𝑖 = 𝐴𝑏(𝛼+𝛽+𝛾)𝐿𝑄𝑏𝛼 𝐻𝑄𝑏𝛽𝐾𝑄𝑏𝛾 𝑍𝑖𝑐         (3.2) 
Using Lucas 𝐻 = 𝑒𝜑𝑆𝐿 ⇒ 𝐻𝑖 is the quality-adjusted labor (Jones, 1997, Becker, 1993), (3.1) can 
be restated as  𝑌𝑖 =  (𝐴𝑖)𝑏𝛼 𝐾𝑖𝑏𝛽𝐾 𝜇 𝑒𝑏𝛽𝐻𝜑 𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑏𝛽𝐻(𝛼+1)𝑍𝑖𝑐        (4.1) 
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With 𝐴𝑖𝑏𝛼 constant and 𝑆 years of schooling, 𝐻 = 𝑓(𝐿), and L is growing at the same rate as 
population, in (4.1) 𝑌𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐾,Z) – an 𝐴𝐾 model. However, according to Amavilah’s (2014a, b) 
extension of Romer 𝐻𝑖 = 𝑒𝜑𝑞𝑁𝑖  ⇒ 𝐻 is quality-adjusted population (𝑁𝑖), which is in line with 
Lewis (1965(1955)), and especially with Schultz’s (1961, 1981) “investment in people.” Also 𝐿𝑄 =  𝜆𝑁𝑖 (a fraction of N) such that (3.2) is now,  𝑌𝑖 = 𝐴𝑏(𝛼+𝛽+𝛾)(𝜆𝑁𝑖𝑏(𝛼+𝛽)𝑒(𝑏𝛽𝜑 𝑞))𝐾𝑄𝑏𝛾𝑍𝑖𝑐  ⇒ 𝑌𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐴, 𝐻, 𝐾, 𝑍).     (4.2) 
Again, note that S and q are both quality adjusters, but S affects only L whereas q affects the whole 
economically active population (N). 
 
4. The COVID19-shocked endogenous economy 
If we shock the economy in (4) with COVID19, then (1) becomes 𝑌𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖𝑏  𝑍𝑖  𝑒𝜃𝐶 ,           (5) 
for 𝐶 ≡ 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐷19 exogenous, and X and Z are endogenous. Adding C, dividing both sides of (4.1) 
by L and taking the natural logarithms we get a Lucas productivity function as 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑎𝐿∗ +  𝛽𝐾∗ 𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽𝐻∗ 𝑆 + 𝑏𝑧𝑖 +  𝜃𝐶,        (6.1) 
which is a per worker expression in which 𝑎𝐿∗ = 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑛𝐴 is a Lucas technological constant, 𝛽𝐾∗ =𝑏𝛽𝐾 is enhanced plant-level physical capital elasticity and 𝛽𝐻∗ = 𝑏𝜇𝛽𝐻𝜑 is enhanced plant-level 
elasticity of human capital measured by the educated and skilled labor (Lucas, 1993). However, in 
Romer we divide through (4.2) by 𝑁𝑖 and take the natural logarithms resulting in   𝑦𝑖 = 𝑎𝑅∗ +  𝛾∗𝑘𝑄 +  𝛽∗𝑞 + 𝑏𝑧𝑖 + 𝜃𝐶,        (6.2) 
where 𝑎𝑅∗ = 𝑏(𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝛾) ln 𝐴 is a Romer endogenous technology, 𝛾∗ = 𝑏𝛾  is enhanced 
elasticity of the national stock of physical capital, 𝛽∗ = 𝑎𝛽𝜑 is enhanced elasticity of national 
stock of human capital measured by quality population as q is includes S. Thus, (6.2) is per capita 
(national productivity), whereas (6.1) is per worker (labor productivity). 
Both Lucas and Romer can be applied to rationalize the doughnut model and both advance Solow 
greatly. However, the Lucas 𝑎𝐿∗  is truly a Solow-neutral technology depending on labor 
productivity, whereas the Solow technological constant (𝑎) is Hicks neutral. Even so, the two are 
not too far apart, because if L and A grow at constant rates, then the rate of 𝑎𝐿∗   will also be constant 
and equal the exogenous rate 𝑑𝐴/𝑑𝑡 in Solow (1956, 1957) originale.  For Romer 𝑎𝑅∗  changes with 
α, β, and γ, which depend on the  𝑁𝑖  ≡  𝐿𝑖  + 𝐻𝑖 constraint, and therefore 𝑎𝑅∗  can neither be 
exogenous nor constant even if/when some of its parts are (Romer, 1990).    
4.1 Variables and data  
The theory is sound, but a major objective of theory is to guide practice, which brings us to the 
empirics of the model. In conventional growth theory, including endogenous versions, interest 
would be in conventional Q, assuming it determines X, and as X goes so too goes Y. Theory also 
observes unavoidable trade-offs between X and Y in which too much equality might be associated 
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with a significant loss of efficiency, low growth, and presumably lower social welfare. The logic 
is particularly good and for the most part consistent with history in at least parts of the world. 
However, until recently the direct effects of Z on X or indirectly on Y were assumed to be the 
exogenous to the original human curse by nature (where nature is God (Nature) for some and 
scientific processes (nature) for others). As Sir W. Arthur Lewis (1965, p. 23) put it “Nature is not 
particularly kind to man; left to herself she will overwhelm with weeds, with floods, with 
epidemics and with other disasters which man wards off by taking thought and action. It is by 
accepting the varied challenges presented by his environment that man is able, in innumerable 
ways, to wrest from nature more product for less effort. … To accept the challenge of nature is to 
be willing to experiment, to seek out opportunities, to respond to openings, and generally to 
manoeuvre. The greatest growth occurs in societies where men have an eye to the economic 
chance, and are willing to stir themselves to seize it.” However, in their review of the contributions 
of Nordhaus and Romer to this literature, Fremstad, Petach, and Tavani (2019) show that the 
disregard for the planetary constraints has been mistaken, even after taking Pindyck’s (2013) 
skepticism into account about whether or not policy models can do any better.  
Here our LHS variables (Y) are a set of human rights: water, food, health, gender equality, social 
equity, energy, jobs, voice, resilience, education, and income. These depend on RHS variables, 
key among them the safe and livable space (X). We can measure that space with the variables like 
HDI and ISEW. The limits to the capacity of the earth are simultaneously the limits to sustainable 
and inclusive development. The definitions and data on “planetary boundaries” are from 
Rockstrom, et al (2011). The variables include climate change, ocean acidification, stratospheric 
ozone depletion, two biogeochemical flow boundary of nitrogen cycle and phosphorous cycle, 
global fresh water use, change in land use, biodiversity loss, atmospheric aerosol loading, and 
chemical pollution – the latter two are yet to be quantified. Rockstrom et al tell us that biodiversity 
and nitrogen cycle boundaries have already been breached, with climate change, phosphorous 
cycle, and ocean acidification not too far behind in that order of emergency.  Rockstrom, et al 
(2011) also provide useful parameters to help in assessing the intensity of pressure of the violations 
impose on the economies (𝑝). My suggestion now is to use the status for each economy divided 
by the proposed (optimal) status that would be conducive to a safe and livable space, i.e., 𝑝 =(𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠). For any 𝑝 > 1 the boundary has been raptured, and Rockstrom and colleagues 
indicate that for climate change 𝑝 = 387350 = 1.11 and for the Nitrogen Cycle 𝑝 = 12135 = 3.46. The 
former means that climate is 11% away from and above its optimality, and the latter the cycle is 
3.5 times worse than it should be (Stockholm Resilience Center, 2020). By putting that much direct 
pressure on 𝑄, 𝑍 ultimately affects 𝑌 adversely. 
4.2 Possible estimation specification 
The econometric specification is (6), adds time-specific effects (ξ), country-specific effects (η), 
and a random error (ε), yielding 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛱0 + 𝛱1𝑥𝑖 + 𝛱2𝑧𝑖 +  𝛱3𝐶 +  𝜉𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,      (7) 
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where x represents the conventional production and is reciprocal to human rights in the way 
Raworth describes (7). Ceteris paribus, we expect human rights to improve (for example, hunger 
goes down) as the material conditions improve. However, for a sustainable and safe space to open, 
planetary boundaries (z) must be honored, give, or take initial conditions (ξ, η) and the randomness 
of events (ε).  
5. Concluding remark 
The structure and behavior of most free-market economies and hence their governing economic 
system of capitalism have change quietly over time. The changes are predicted by changes in one 
of the basic economic models, the circular flow model of economic activity. Some role for 
Government allowed capitalism to grow (pre-1917) and to thrive (1918-1980s). Post-1980 
Government became “the problem” and policies aided the emergence of super capitalism. 
Processes associated with super capitalism such as globalization and rapid technological change 
increased income and wealth, thereby setting in motion economic convergence across countries 
along with huge inequality within countries. I have term this capitalism super-duper capitalism. 
Super-duper capitalism enables all sorts of dissatisfactions, chief among these unpopular populism 
and nationalism. The stresses of super-duper capitalism strained both the social foundations and 
“planetary boundaries” thereby boa-constricting the “safe operating space for [all] humanity” and 
making it both less inclusive and sustainable. Shocked by COVID19 it is not farfetched to imagine 
a system that was already slouching towards an illusion now scurrying towards a delusion in 
response. This is not a new thought. Marx thought that the declining rate of profit will weaken 
capitalism leading to socialism and in the end to a heaven on earth he envisioned in communism. 
From Marx, Schumpeter (1942) derived the notion that the “gale of creative destruction [is the] 
process of industrial that continuously revolutionizes the economic structure from within 
increasingly creating a new one” (p. 83, original italics). The revolution has four key features, 
three of which I list but do not discuss: the circular, the role of the entrepreneur, the cyclical process 
of the development of innovations, and the decay of innovations. Capitalism is a human 
innovation; it decays when the entrepreneur becomes obsolete, its institutional foundations are 
destroyed, and the political strata are exposed (Schumpeter, 1954).3 This essay does not provide 
empirical measurements for the observations made. Nevertheless, it suggests directions for policy 
and future research.   
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